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-2-competitive position through a devaluation of the real exchange rate had run its course in autumn 2007. With unemployment down sharply, conditions in the labor market were gradually returning to normal. The latest wage settlements and reports of capacity shortages at that time were a clear indication that Germany's competitive adjustment process had been completed. Hence, once the euro hits $1.45, the guess was that it would be too strong even for Mr Steinbrueck's taste because it would endanger Germany's improvements in competitiveness (Munchau 2007) . But at what level at all does the external value of the euro hit its "pain threshold", for instance, vis-à-vis the dollar?
In order to clarify issues in this respect, the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we motivate why it makes sense to investigate the question of a "pain threshold" exchange rate and give a brief historical overview of such claims referring to the $/€ exchange rate. In section 3, we derive a simple model which serves to capture the non-linear hysteresis-type dynamics inherent in the relation between the exchange rate and exports. Taking this model as a starting point, we develop an algorithm describing play-hysteresis and implement it into a regression framework in section 4. In section 5, we estimate the exchange rate impacts on German exports to the US, differentiating between intervals of weak and strong reaction.
Based on this regression we come up with an estimate of Germany's current "pain threshold" of the $/€ exchange rate. Section 6 concludes.
Three episodes of $/€ exchange rate "pain thresholds" and their main lessons
But at what level at all does the euro hit its "pain threshold", for instance, vis-à-vis the dollar?
A closer look into the more recent episodes in which the $/€ rate reached "all-time highs" and, thus, at least local maxima might be helpful in this regard. According to Figure Moreover, another important stylized fact is that in general German exports tend to move much slower than the $/€ exchange rate. If exports react to movements in the exchange rate, this reaction initially tends to be much less than proportional. Only if exchange rate changes are one-directional and steady (downward in the first part and upward in the second part of the sample period) also exports react more significantly.
-3- Source: own calculation based on time series from Eurostat, WM/Reuters and OECD.
The history of local maxima of the $/€ exchange rate
Figure 1 reveals that for three years before May 19, 2004 , the exchange rate of the euro against the dollar has traveled a one-way street -upwards. From the perspective of business, the short correction in exchange rates which was taking place thereafter gave German industry some breathing room at best, but did nothing to solve the fundamental problems of a too high exchange rate. Since reaching its lowest level at the end of the year 2000, it has appreciated until May 19, 2004, in rate was close to where it should be. In its monthly bulletin of January 2002, the ECB published a list of more than a dozen independent estimates for the equilibrium exchange rate of the euro. The average came to about $1.17. Moreover, the exchange rate of 1.18 dollar per euro has often been called a "pain threshold" and a threat for German exporters closely corresponds to the starting exchange rate at the birth date of European Economic and
Monetary Union in 1999 (ECB Observer 2004) . The exchange rate prevailing at the end of February 2004 of around $1.25 was thus said to be not that far off. Even though these estimates were at that time two years old, some ECB officials still looked to them as a rough guide. This means that their "pain threshold" was significantly higher than Mr. Schroeder's or Mr Raffarin's at that time. For instance, Munchau's (2004) guess was that the German and According to Figure 1 , the $/€ exchange rate exceeded its 1.40 threshold and thus acknowledge that official acceptance of the moves in the foreign exchange market had limits.
On November 21 he warned that there was a "pain threshold", even though he did not (could not?) define it, adding "I'm aware of the fact that there is a limit". He noted that the competitiveness of German companies ensured that the euro's strength was no cause of worry, but was unable to say whether that would be sufficient going forward. But the debate about exchange rate "pain thresholds" for EU exports continued with unfettered intensity also in 2008 because companies that rely on dollar-denominated sales -2 Also Guy Quaden, a governor of the ECB, has warned against "brutal" moves in the exchange rate (EvansPritchard 2007).
-6-such as Airbus -were feeling considerably more pain. For instance, Louis Gallois, chief executive of Airbus' parent European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. warned that "we are at levels which are becoming unbearable". He argued that it could force the company to shift more of its costs into dollars by moving production outside of the euro area and making acquisitions in dollar-based countries. For Airbus, which sells its planes in dollars while many of its costs are in euros, each 10-cent rise in the euro against the dollar costs 1 billion euros ($1.59 billion) (White 2008 where the exchange rate level will start to cause serious harm to the European economy." (White 2008 ).
This debate was clearly overshadowed in the aftermath by the recent financial and economic crisis. Not earlier than on July 17, 2009 , it became alive again. The recent appreciation of the euro against the dollar is not structural and therefore not worrying, the chairman of euro zone finance ministers, Jean-Claude Juncker said at that time. 'I don't think that we are facing a strengthening -in a structural sense -of the euro, so recent moves are not worrying,' he told Reuters. Before, the euro had firmed to $1.4146 on July 9 th , from $1.3830
on July 8th, and has been rising steadily from $1.2455 at the start of March 2009. European exporters said on the same occasion that the "pain threshold" for them is an exchange rate above $1.40. However, the discussion even gained momentum in October 2009 when the $/€ exchange rate climbed to values of around 1.50 and some ECB rhetoric against a "too high rate" started again (Strupczewski 2009 The situation was no better with regard to medium-sized industry in Germany, quite the reverse, in fact. As a rule, medium-sized firms have few opportunities to adopt globalized strategies to cover themselves against undesirable exchange rate risks. So indeed there were quite a few companies which benefited from the strength of the euro which went along with the weakness of the dollar as, for instance, the tourism industry as are naturally all those sectors which derive a cost benefit from the cheap dollar but have their main market in the EU and/or Germany (Wartenberg 2004). Let us now discuss why -quite contradictory to the anecdotic evidence cited above -reactions of German exports to the US to $/€ exchange rate movements tend to be rather weak unless a "pain" threshold is passed by the exchange rate.
Why is the reaction of German exports to small to medium-sized exchange rate movements so weak?
In contrast to its counterparts in most of the other euro area member countries, the German export industry has at least in the short run become much less vulnerable to exchange rate movements in the recent years. What are the reasons of weak reactions of German exports to exchange rate movements?
Hedging of exchange rate uncertainty
In the short run, i.e. in case of an only transitory appreciation of the euro, the choice of the invoice currency and the extent of cross-currency hedging play a role. Currently, around 80 percent of German exports are invoiced in euros and only 13 percent in US dollars. Moreover, three quarters of all foreign currency receivables from export business are hedged against exchange rate related losses for some time (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008) . These exchangetraded or even tailor-made hedging deals are able to cushion the appreciation pressure only for a limited period. Even firms with a professional exchange rate management such as, for instance, Porsche, are hedged only for some years. Moreover, from the perspective of a single firm, hedging leads to additional fixed costs of exports (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2008, pp. 35ff.).
-9-Many enterprises, especially most of the larger companies, have hedged their exchange rate risks, although as a rule only partially (around 30 to 50 %). Only a few companies take action to secure complete protection against foreign currency liabilities. In the case of most medium-sized firms, it is not usual practice to hedge foreign exchange risks.
They simply lack experience in this field. Here the drop in the value of the dollar really hits home and heterogeneity of German exporting firms comes into the game again.
German export product line and price elasticity of exports
What is more, world demand of German products reacts only less than proportionally to a price increase since also the structure of German's product line is behind Germany's export success. The price elasticity of German exports has diminished markedly in recent years.
Empirical studies show that, if domestic prices rise by 1% relative to foreign prices, real exports go down by 0.25%. This relatively small influence is due partly to the fact that the share of relatively price-inelastic goods in the range of German exports is quite high. Exports to non-euro area countries, in particular, respond relatively weakly to price competitiveness (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008).
Even more important: making up for a share of around 40% in 2007, machinery, equipment and vehicles dominate Germany's industrial production. Demand of these capital goods has been very strong globally until the current financial and economic crisis has fed itself into international trade. German firms are often highly specialized in these areas and in terms of technology maintained their position as the world market leader. As a consequence, importers are not able to or even do not want to switch to other suppliers even when the external value of the euro increases because switching costs would be too high for them.
Foreign consumers are just stuck and "caught" in their relation to German suppliers. Even in the US, although it already headed into a record recession, the demand for capital goods kept quite stable until the late 2008 due to the sustained high corporate gains. Thereby, Germany displays a more balanced export profile than France with its focus on aeronautics and aerospace and Spain and Italy which export relatively many low tech-goods such as textiles and food.
Relief on the export side by cheaper imports
However, the current appreciation of the euro generally affects not only firms' export sales but also their costs by reducing the price of the imported intermediate inputs that go into the manufacture of exported goods. These imported inputs latterly made up 45% of exports, as -10-against 31% in 1995. In addition, the prices of most commodities (including crude oil) in the world markets are quoted in US dollars. The appreciation-related cost relief, which has been particularly noticeable in Germany's energy bills, was a key factor in ensuring that, all in all, German exporters have coped relatively well with the strengthening euro in the past few years.
Adjusting intermediate inputs and outsourcing as a natural hedge
To some degree, exporters can offset exchange rate-related losses in price competitiveness by adjusting their intermediate inputs. Firms can, for instance, transfer their business at fairly short notice to suppliers from countries whose currencies have depreciated against the euro or otherwise provide cost advantages (examples are EADS, Boehringer Ingelheim and Böwe Syntec). Medium to long-term strategies are aimed more at restructuring production and revising the firm's internal policies for choosing production sites. In this way the share of imported intermediate inputs from low-cost countries can be increased at the expense of domestically generated value added -made more expensive by currency appreciation -or else manufacturing can be shifted partly to other, lower-cost countries in order to be able to sell the final products at competitive euro prices without any (major) losses in revenues (Axarloglou and Kouvelis 1999, Deutsche Bundesbank 2008 ).
An important element of this strategy is "natural hedging", which has been practised, for instance, by the German automotive industry (DaimlerChrysler) and its suppliers particularly in the past 15 years by establishing or at least envisaged (BMW) manufacturing capacity in the United States. This means not only that products are delivered to the local buyers without any exchange rate risk but that, if the euro appreciates, exchange rate-related losses from German exports to the USA are offset within the firm through exports to Europe.
Such a hedge can also be achieved by buying equity stakes or existing manufacturing sites (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008).
Sunk costs
Recent research in international economics, employing theoretical analysis and assessment of firm level data clearly confirm that "sunk costs matter" (Godard, Goerg and Goerlich 2009).
In a nutshell, this implies that setting up of global export networks coincides with substantial set up costs. These costs can to a large extent not be recouped once a firm leaves the export market or terminates its international customer-supplier relationships (the latter being especially significant in the German case of car producers which dominate German exports).
-11-Examples of sunk costs of exporting are thought to be mainly those of information gathering on the new market (costs for market research), setting up new foreign distribution networks, marketing and possibly repackaging of the product to appeal to new consumers, paying for lawyers versed in the law of the foreign country, etc. While setting up a global export distribution network presupposes that the respective firm has covered these costs and got the knowledge, the value of this knowledge tends to depreciate rather quickly once the firm has left the export market (Roberts and Tybout 1997) . The literature on German firm export decisions has found considerable persistence in export status over time. For example, Bernard and Wagner (2001) test for the role of plant characteristics and sunk costs in the entry decision, using a panel of German manufacturing plants. They find entry and exit among their German sample of 2.4 percent and 2.3 percent, indicating a huge impact of sunk costs.
All in all, the entry of German firms into export markets once included obtaining unknown information about consumption patterns and market potential, setting up distribution and service networks, bearing the costs of establishing a brand name through advertising, and bringing the foreign product into conformity with domestic health regulations. These costs are firm-specific and cannot be resold on exiting the market, at least in terms of their total value, being therefore regarded as irreversible or partially irreversible investments (Kannebley 2008) . What is more, the great bulk of German firms which are willing and able to export to the US have entered the US market during the last peak of the world's business cycle in 2004
at the latest and, thus, are already in the US market. Hence, regarding the euro's appreciation, the market situation is currently such that German firms are currently prevented from exit rather than prevented from entry by sunk costs. Since significant sunk costs are usually associated with entry into each new export market, we would expect to see a high level of persistence in the firms' export activities on the US destination markets.
Price-setting of German exporting firms
Research in general has shown that German export prices display a weakening of cost passthrough and a strengthening of pricing-to-market. The results indicate that the price pick-up of German export goods compared with competitors' products in foreign markets resulting from an appreciation of the domestic currency has been smaller since German unification than it was in the 1980s. This implies that a permanently strong euro is being absorbed more through a reduction in the profit margin, thus at least temporarily lowering the return on capital. This will be especially valid for the German automobile and machinery sector.
Enterprises are evidently now keener to avoid losses in sales volume following currency -12-appreciation (and, thus, prefer an only weak reaction of export volumes) than they were in the 1980s. Tougher international competition in the wake of ongoing globalization, the establishment of the euro area or EU enlargement, but also advances in productivity and the deregulation of product and labor markets and the clearer prioritising of price stability by central banks worldwide, which pushed down inflation expectations, might be potential reasons for the reduced price-setting range of German firms (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008, pp. 44f.). Firms cannot roll over a permanent appreciation of the euro on to prices. On the whole, export prices calculated in euro, as a weighted average of all export sectors, are adjusted to include only around one-eighth of each respective change in exchange rates (Stahn 2007) .
Overall assessment
Seen on the whole, we feel legitimized to argue that there are some sectors in which German exporters should display only a weak reaction to movements in the exchange rate. At the same time, however, it should be clear that firms are heterogeneous in their ability to withstand an adverse development of the exchange rate for a while. What is more, if there is a permanent upward trend in the external value of the euro, there will be a threshold exchange rate which will induce exporters in all sectors of the German economy to react strongly with reductions in exports. This is partly because whether or not firms will tolerate and will be able to cope with reduced export revenues owing to currency appreciation depends, among other things, on whether they see the shifts in exchange rates as being temporary or permanent.
What do these considerations imply for the future German export perspectives?
Traditionally, experts make heavy weather of answering this type of question. It has become a stylized fact that different sectors of the economy are to a different degree sensitive to exchange rate movements, depending on their export shares and shares of imported raw materials and intermediates. It is also quite sure that the threshold has been steadily increasing in the recent years. While there was some talk of around 1.30 dollar per euro for some time, in the meantime many German exporters start to lament not until around 1.45 dollar per euro is reached. In the following, we try explain why this is so. For this purpose, let us now turn to our model of hysteresis in exports.
-13-
Hysteresis in exports 3.1 The emergence of a 'band of inaction' from a microeconomic perspective
Hysteresis in foreign trade generally occurs if sunk market-entry costs exist (Baldwin 1989 (Baldwin , 1990 . Potentially exporting firms must expend market-entry investments, e.g. in setting up a distribution and service network or for introductory sales promotion, in order to sell in the export market. These expenses are firm-specific and cannot be recovered if the firm later wants to leave the market; i.e. the entry costs are sunk. If the prices on the export market do not change in proportion to the exchange rate, the exporting firms have to bear revenue changes in their home currency when the exchange rate alters. If the foreign currency appreciates (i.e. the home currency depreciates), a market entry may become profitable, namely under consideration of the sunk entry costs.
After a firm has entered the export market, the foreign currency may again depreciate.
However, as long as the variable costs are covered, once in the market, it is still profitable for the firm to sell. A previous entry is not fully reversed due to entry costs which have to be considered as sunk ex post. Analogous effects would result in the case of sunk exit costs. The resulting reaction pattern to exchange rate changes for a single exporting firm h is depicted in Figure 2 . The exchange rate x is defined as the home currency price of foreign exchange. An exchange rate x c exactly compensates for the variable unit costs of the firm. A devaluation (i.e. an increase of e) increases the unit revenues finally changed back into the exporters home currency. Since the sunk entry costs must be covered, a market entry requires an entry exchange rate x in which exceeds the variable costs (x c ). A previously active firm will exit if the losses are larger than the sunk exit costs. Hence the exit trigger x out must be located below x c . Seen on the whole, thus, the entry and the exit triggers generally differ in a situation with sunk entry and exit costs. The microeconomic path-dependence occurs discontinuously if entry or exit trigger rates are passed. 7 Combining both triggers results in a 'band of inaction'.
Inside this band, the current exchange rate does not unambiguously determine the current state of the firm's activity.
7
According to Krasnosel'skii and Pokrovskii (1989) , p. 263, this pattern corresponds to a so-called "non-ideal relay". Uncertainty, e.g. about the future exchange rate, reinforces the hysteresis characteristics via option value effects. 8 Since an exit will destroy the market entry investments, an exporting firm may stay when the home currency devalues even if it is currently losing money. If the devaluation would prove to be only transitory, an immediate exit could turn out to be a mistake. Hence, under uncertainty the opportunity of a "wait-andsee"-strategy shifts the exit trigger to the left. Analogously waiting with an entry in a situation with uncertainty shifts the entry trigger to the right. Thus, the "band of inaction" is widened by uncertainty.
Exchange rate changes will result in substantial home currency revenue changes of the exporting firm if the price elasticity of demand in the export market is high. By implication, for a low price elasticity of demand exchange rate changes do not result in severe unit revenue changes. Thus, the band-of-inaction will be the wider, the lower is the demand elasticity, higher is the value of the sunk entry and exit costs and the higher is the uncertainty about the future situation of the exporter.
On a microeconomic level hysteresis occurs via a band of inaction, i.e. differences between both trigger/thresholds. Belke and Goecke (2005) focus on the shape and the location of a macroeconomic hysteresis loop, i.e. the problem of aggregation. 9 Aggregation is not 8
For a comprehensive treatment of uncertainty effects see Dixit, Pindyck (1994) . For an empirical application to trade see, based on macro time series, Parsley and Wei (1993) and Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Campa (2004) who work with micro panel data.
-15-trivial if heterogeneity regarding the value of sunk exit/entry costs and/or the level of uncertainty about future market situation and/or the elasticity of demand exist, i.e. if the entry and exit trigger rates are different for different exporting firms. In this (realistic) case of heterogeneity the transition from the micro to the macro level leads to a change of the hysteresis characteristics: the aggregate hysteresis loop shows no discontinuities (as known from magnetics). However, a pattern not very different to a "band of inaction" is remaining. Belke and Goecke (2005) show that even the macro behavior can be characterized by areas of weak reactions which are -corresponding to mechanical play -called "play"-area.
10
Persistent aggregate (export) effects do not result from small changes in the forcing (exchange rate) variables, as far as the changes occur inside a play area. However, if changes go beyond the play area, sudden strong reactions (and persistence effects) of the output variable (i.e. exports) occur. 11 The specific realization of the exchange rate reached instantly after the complete passing of the play area can be denoted as a "pain threshold", since, passing this rate, the reaction of exports to changes in the exchange rate becomes much stronger.
However, play-hysteresis is in two aspects different to the micro-loop. First, as mentioned the play-loop shows no discontinuities. Second, analogous to the play in mechanics (e.g. when steering a car) the play area is shifted with the history of the forcing variable (exchange rate):
Every change in the movement of the forcing variable starts with traversing a play area. Not until the play is passed, a spurt reaction will result, if the forcing variable continues move in the same direction.
In the following section, a straightforward empirical framework to test for a play-type impact of the exchange rate on exports is presented. We use an algorithm developed in Belke and Goecke (2001) describing play-hysteresis and implement it into a regression framework.
An empirical model of play-hysteresis

A linear approximation of exchange rate impacts on exports
In order to convey an impression of the simplified linearized play-dynamics -as theoretically developed by Goecke (2001, 2005) and described briefly in the introduction -we first illustrate the implications based on the interpretation of Figure 3 . Here, we assume a constant width p of the play area to simplify issues. We start with an initial situation in point suddenly leads to a strong decrease of the exports. Thus, x 3 is a kind of "pain threshold".
However, this "pain threshold" is not a constant trigger level as in the micro ("relais") loop, but path-dependent, since the play lines are vertically shifted by movements along the spurt lines. The play area is shifted in the opposite direction as before, so that for a subsequent increase again to x 3 (F) the reaction is described by line EF.
11
For a empirical macro analysis of 'spurts' in investment implicitly based on micro-threshold models see Darby et al. (1999) . See Pindyck (1988) , pp. 980 f., Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , pp. 15 f., for a non-technical description of 'spurts' based on a microeconomic sunk cost mechanism.
12
In the case of 'mechanical play' there even would not be any reaction of y inside the play area. See Krasnosel'skii and Pokrovskii (1989), p. 8.
-17- 
An algorithm capturing linear play
In the following, we present a hybrid version of a play algorithm which was originally developed by Goecke (2001, 2005) for the analysis of employment hysteresis and finally adapt it to our main research question, i.e. the identification of an exchange rate "pain threshold" for German exports. The change in the forcing variable x (Δx) may occur either inside the play area p inducing a weak reaction or on a spurt line resulting in a strong reaction of the dependent variable y (Δy). The movement of x inside the play area is Δa (and cumulated as a) and analogously the movement in the spurt area is Δs. We start with a special case, when Δx enters a play area. Let this change be denoted as Δx s j . according to this corresponds to the trajectory B → C → E. In the past the movement of x has led to j changes between the left and the right spurt line. The new change Δx (2) Δy s j = α ⋅ a j + (α + β) ⋅ Δs j with: |α| < |α + β|
The play line is shifted vertically by spurt movements. The cumulated vertical displacement V j-1 of the relevant play line as a result of all previous movements on both spurt lines is:
with:
The dependent variable is determined by the shift V induced by past spurts and the current reaction Δs t + α ⋅ Δx t + λ ⋅ z t  y t = C + α ⋅ x t + β ⋅ s t + λ ⋅ z t .
Empirical analysis
The hypothesis of hysteresis in foreign trade was initially tested by Baldwin (1990) and Krugman and Baldwin (1987) based on macroeconomic time series for the U.S. economy by employing dummy variables associated with periods of exchange rate appreciation. Parsley and Wei (1993) came up with empirical models that try to capture the asymmetric effect of real exchange rate fluctuations and real exchange rate volatility on the imported quantities.
However, they cast doubt on the validity of the hysteresis hypothesis as an explanation of the 13 For a detailed description of the algorithm calculating the artificial spurt variable s t and for the implementation into an EVIEWS-batch program see Belke and Goecke (2001) .
-20-persistent U.S. trade deficits in the 1980s. Based on micro firm level data, and thus with a focus on the discontinous micro-hysteresis (however, emphasizing the heterogeneity of firms) Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Campa (2004) discovered sunk cost hysteresis to be an important factor in determining export market participation. Agur (2003) has found empirical evidence of structural breaks in the exchange rate import volume relation as a consequence of exchange rate extrema. Using a threshold cointegration model of Brazilian sectoral foreign trade data, Kannebley (2008) was able to identify an asymmetric (i.e. hysteretic) adjustment in 9 of 16 sectors.
Compared to existing studies of hysteresis in foreign trade, our approach is closer to the original concept of a macroeconomic "hysteresis loop", since (i) it is not based on the discontinuous non-ideal relay interpretation as in the microeconomic firm level case and since (ii) the path-dependent structural breaks in the macroeconomic relations are not added to the system as an exogenous information. On the contrary, in our approach the structural shifts are explicitly determined by the history of the exchange rate and the exports and are simultaneously estimated together with the (path dependent) relation of exports to the exchange rate.
Data and variables
In order to check for the empirical relevance of the hysteresis model for German exports, we now estimate equation (5) which generalizes hysteretic behavior of exports dependent on movements in the exchange rate. In our empirical application, we use German exports to the US as the dependent variable both at the aggregated level and disaggregated by product groups (SITC) and the $/€ exchange rate as the hysteretic input variable. To be parsimonious as possible, we employ foreign real GDP, a linear trend and seasonal dummies as additional non-hysteretic explaining variables. For linear spline functions and linear switching regressions see Poirier (1976) , p. 9 and p. 117.
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See Hujer (1986) , pp. 231 ff., Poirier (1976) , pp. 108 ff., pp. 117 ff. and p. 129, Hudson (1966) and Hinkley (1969) for the small sample properties of the ML-(OLS-) estimates in a model with unknown but continuous switches.
-22-application of standard cointegration analysis. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any technique which is directly applicable to our specific model and therefore delivers the distributions and the respective critical values of the relevant estimators. Thus, any solution to these problems is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
We are now endowed with the necessary equipment to conduct an empirical application to German exports to the US of the play regression model. In accordance with section 2, we call the $/€ exchange rate value at which a transition from a play to a spurt reaction of aggregate German US-exports occurs a "pain threshold". The empirical identification of these path-dependent switching thresholds must of course been seen with the necessary caution, due to the above mentioned imponderabilities with respect to inference.
We apply our algorithm to estimate the play-hysteretic model by minimizing the residual sum of squares i.e. by the OLS-method. For this purpose, we enact a grid search over the width of a time invariant play parameter p t = p = γ. For every given point of the γ-grid the algorithm "recognize" the switches and for the given γ the spurt variable s is computed from the actual input (exchange rate) series. The size of γ is predetermined for each grid point. The respective OLS-estimation of α and β for each grid point is straightforward since s enters the regression equation (5) in a linear way. The final OLS-estimate of the play parameter is determined by choosing from the grid the γ-value with the minimum of the residual sum of squares (i.e. the maximum of the R-squared).
Hypotheses
In order to derive the hypotheses to be tested, we have to take into account that the width of the play p t was not addressed up to now. In a simple case p t is defined as a constant parameter, i.e. a time-invariant width of the play area p t = p = γ , which has to be estimated.
According to our description of the play dynamics in section 3, the relevant hypotheses to be tested must refer to the equations:
16
(5') y t = C + α ⋅ x t + β ⋅ s t (γ) + λ ⋅ z t with: |α| < |α + β| (6) p t = γ with: γ ≥ 0.
However, it appears to be quite straightforward how to generalize the model in a way where the play width p t is not constant and determined by other variables. For instance, the higher an uncertainty variable u t is, the more important are option value effects of waiting, and thus the play area is expected to widen. See eq. (12) in the appendix for this generalization.
-23-If we want to check whether play is relevant at all, we have to test the hypothesis (H1) β ≠ 0 against the alternative β = 0. According to Goecke (2001, 2005) , the hypothesis to be tested might even be more restrictive, since a weaker play and a stronger spurt reaction (both with the same sign) are assumed as the "typical" hysteresis pattern.
If one (for the moment) neglects possible limitations on inference resulting from, for instance, non-finite variances of the variables, the OLS-estimates of the respective equations can -according to section 4 -be regarded as asymptotically unbiased (i.e. consistent) and asymptotically normally distributed. However, since the small sample properties remain problematic we refrain from further conclusions concerning exact inference and for the moment only convey a broad-brush view of the basic pattern of the results. Therefore, the following regression results serve more as a first illustration of the working of our algorithm and the main direction of results rather than a basis for exact inference. While there is evidence that our OLS approach is quite robust, we leave the latter task for future research.
Empirical results
Evidence for total exports
As a baseline we start with a standard regression of German total exports on the US on the PPP adjusted (PPI) $/€ exchange rate (RER) excluding play or spurt effects. In terms of the play model, thus, the restriction β = 0 is applied. We display the corresponding results in Table   1 .
-24- All variables are (according to the empirical realizations of the t-statistics) highly significant and display the theoretically expected sign. The US GDP variable enters with a lag of one quarter (best fit for lagged data and to avoid problems of reverse causation) whereas the real $/€ exchange rate is considered contemporaneously (otherwise J-curve-effects might occur which might severely interfere with the hysteretic sub-system).
As a next step, we conduct a one-dimensional grid search in order to estimate γ for the simple case with constant play (see Figure 5 ). The sequence of R² dependent on different realizations of γ shows an absolute maximum at γ = 0.24 with an R² = 0.967891. The minimum of the R² plot at the realization γ = 0 (R² = 0.946960) exactly corresponds to the Rsquared of the standard model as stated in Table 1 . The respective OLS-estimates of the spurt/play regression with an artificial spurt-variable (SPURT) based on this constant width p = γ = 0.24 of the play area is presented in Table 2 .
-25- Again, all estimated coefficients display the theoretically expected sign. Note that the spurt-variable seems to substitute the effects of original the real $/€ exchange rate. With respect to the hypothesis (H1) β ≠ 0 the estimated coefficient of the spurt variable is β = -9385.067 with an empirical realization of the t-value of -5.59. However, since the -26-small sample properties of our regression model are still basically unknown, the t-values are most probably not student-t-distributed. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that this high empirical t-realization (which is about three times as high as the 5% critical value in the case of the standard student-t-distribution) represents a strong hint at the relevance of play. should be still valid today, i.e. at the time this paper has been written. To be more specific, it is equivalent to the last RER maximum of our quarterly series and amounts to about 1.55 US dollar per euro in terms of the nominal exchange rate. We interpret this figure as the current "pain threshold", where a strong spurt reaction of the export to a further appreciation of the we would like to point at the fact that inflation was -not at least due to the financial crisis and its transatlantic spillovers -moderate and nearly the same on both sides of the Atlantic since the start-of-year until today. Hence, inference with respect to the nominal $/€ exchange rate by and large corresponds with inference with respect to the real exchange rate.
Due to option value effects the path-dependent hysteresis effects will be the more important and, technically speaking the play area will be the wider, the more uncertain the economic environment is for the exporting firms. Vast uncertainty related to the financial crisis was highly important in 2008, but was substantially reduced in the meantime. Economic and financial uncertainty is now still slightly but steadily falling, at least according to all indicators of the financial fear factor as the DAX volatility index (VDAX) and the implied volatility on the S&P100. Obviously, the global policy response to the financial and economic crisis has calmed stock markets 'as the fears of an economic Armageddon have subsided'.
Also political uncertainty has dropped after many world leaders had clarified the details of their stimulus packages (Bloem and Floetotto 2009 ). However, we did not explicitly incorporate uncertainty variables and correspondingly a time-variable play width in our spurt regression. Therefore, our estimation of the play width and thus the estimation of the "pain threshold" may be interpreted as a kind of a "maximum" estimate of the play width and of the upper border of the play area (interpreted as a "pain threshold"). Corrected for the reduction of uncertainty, the current threshold may even take a value below 1.55 $/€.
Evidence on the sectoral level
Since sunk costs, uncertainty effects and the market structure are different for specific branches, we expect differences in the play-width for different sectors. Strikingly, the overall -28-empirical pattern continues to hold if we use German exports disaggregated by commodities (SITC-Groups) and conduct the same regression exercises once again. For instance, we find a slightly higher play γ = 0.25 for the SITC-Group 7 consisting of machinery and transport equipment. 63% of the German Exports to the US (in the average of the period from 1995-2009) consist of goods from this SITC-Group. The quite detailed results stemming from this exercise can be found in Table 3, Table 4 and Figure 7 . For the SITC-Subgroup 78 (Road vehicles including air-cushion vehicles) we able to identify a play of γ = 0.23. These goods cover on average 26% of the German exports to the -30-USA over the observed period. We present the corresponding results in Table 5, Table 6 and Figure 8 . Since the two sectors explicitly covered by us represent about three quarters of the German exports to the US, it turns out that the play of both groups of goods taken together nearly completely drives the play for the exports. Due to high market-entry cost emerging -32-especially in the machinery and automobile branches, it is not surprising that we could find the best fit of a play-spurt dynamics especially for these goods. As expected play-spurt dynamics are not important in sectors with homogenous goods where sunk market entry costs are negligible, we did not find any plausible play for the commodity groups 1 to 6 (SITC, the respective regression results are not explicitly stated in this paper).
Conclusions
The paper deals with the impact of the exchange rate on the relationship among German exports and its main determinants. Our main aim has been to identify an exchange rate "pain threshold" for German exporters. We rely on a nonlinear path-dependent model in which suddenly strong spurts of exports occur when changes of the exchange rate go beyond a so called "play area" (which is similar to the phenotype of play in mechanics). We capture this on-linear dynamics in a simplified linearized way and implement an algorithm describing linear play hysteresis into a suitable regression framework. Our non-linear model including play displays a much better performance than the standard linear model. Thus, the implications of some hysteretic macro models concerning the dynamics of aggregate labor demand are corroborated empirically for trade variables as well.
Moreover, we are able to show that the frequently mentioned notion of an exactly identified unique "pain threshold" of the $/€ exchange rate simply does not exist. Instead, we come up with an estimate of a path-dependent play area width of 24 US dollar cent per euro for total German exports to the US. Taking into account that the borders of the play area and, thus, also the "pain threshold" (as the upper border) "today" depend on the historical path of the RER until "today", the location of the play area and the "pain threshold" is dependent on the observation point in time.
For instance, at the end of our estimation period, our estimation results imply a "pain threshold" of 1.55 $/€ which continued to hold in October 2009. Compared to the more recent laments of business German business representatives and also to the more recent implicit assessment by the ECB this threshold is slightly but not substantially higher. On October 22nd, 2009, the dollar hit the 1.50 level, implying that we are currently not too far away from this threshold -especially if we take into account that macroeconomic uncertainty has shrunk slightly but steadily since the turn-of-the-year 2008/09 . However, laments appeared to be quite contained these days until very recently. The interesting question then is why this time "it was so different". We feel legitimized to preliminarily argue that maybe the awareness of -33-appreciation of the euro has been overlaid and dominated by the public reception of the economic and financial crisis.
But as in recent episodes of local maxima of the $/€ exchange rate, also the ECB is also now apparently becoming increasingly aware that a stronger euro must absolutely be avoided. Further euro strengthening in the remainder of the year will have a significant impact on 2010 economic growth, for instance, in export dependent Germany, and make the ECB's own pessimistic forecasts for this year even more probable. Hence, this may become a new era of the ECB's rhetoric on exchange rates because (i) it will be the euro area which will have to bear the burden of the global adjustment and (ii) voting majorities in the ECB Council have changed in the meantime to the benefit of former weak currency countries which are inclined to enact central bank interventions in the FX markets in order to weaken their home currencies.
What does all this lead us? If, as a result of global imbalances, the external value of the euro increases even further, the demand for German exports will fall dramatically and (units of) German firms reduce or even stop trading internationally, then re-entrance into international trade will be severely hampered, even if the euro will devaluate again in the future. So, once there will be a zero entry in any export good category, the concern is that it is going to be hard for exporters in this goods category to re-establish their export nodes and get back in. 17 A German firm may even be likely to decide not to re-establish global trading networks again, or, at a minimum, it might take some time before it well be capable of doing so. Hence, the "ever rising euro" may have consequences that go well beyond the prediction of any standard economic model incorporating a unique exports equilibrium, when the presence of global trading networks and sunk costs of for German exporters is acknowledged.
